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EDWIN BAKER GAGER
Edwin Baker Gager graduated from Yale College in 1877. He was
admitted to the bar in I881 and became a member of the firm of Wooster
& Torrance in Derby. On the appointment of Judge Torrance to the
Superior Court the name of the firm was changed to Wooster, Williams
& Gager and on the death of the senior partner to Williams & Gager.
Judge Gager was appointed to the Superior Court in i9oi, and after
seventeen years of service as a trial judge he became in 1918 an associate
justice of the Supreme Court of Errors. From 1892 to 19o3 he was
an instructor in law aid jurisprudence in the Yale School of Law, and
in 1903 was appointed Professor of General Jurisprudence. As a law-
yer he soon gained the confidence of the large business interests located
in the Naugatuck Valley, and in the later years of his practice his coun-
sel and advocacy were claimed chiefly by street railway, gas, and electric
companies.
He brought to the office of trial judge the poise of a man of affairs,
the experience of an extensive practice, the learning of a widely read
[869]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
lawyer and an unfailing patience, courtesy, and dignity. These qualities
with his accurate sense of proportion, his quick appreciation of the
decisive points of the cause, and above all his kindly and forceful per-
sonality endeared him to the profession as a judge and as a man. In
charging the jury he possessed to an uncommon degree the art of
confining them to the underlying issues of fact. His judicial opinions
were notable for their exhaustiveness and finality. His teaching was
accurate in principle and practical in detail. One of his most distinctive
qualities was a passion for going to the root of things. It was this, no
doubt, which first led him to the study of jurisprudence though
immersed in the practical applications of the law; and it gave him the
power of seeing things as they were, with the clear vision of intellectual
honesty undimmed by indolence, sympathy, or opportunism. He had a
singular directness and vigor of statement.
The combination of intellectual and personal qualities I have
attempted to outline was crowned by a simplicity of manner and apersonal charm enhanced by the background of his long and distin-
guished public service.
JOHN K. BEACHl
Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors
REGULATION OF INTRASTATE COMMERCE UNDER THE CO]MMERCE CLAUSE
The two recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Rail-
road Commission of Wisconsin v. C. B. & Q. Ry. (1922) 42 Sup. Ct.
232, and State of New York v. United States (1922) 42 Sup. Ct. 239,
represent what is in many ways the most significant development in
that phase of our law having to do with the relation between the power
of the Federal Government and the power of the states to regulate the
instrumentalities of commerce since Gibbons v. Ogden.3 The Supreme
Court has construed the Transportation Act of 192o as conferring upon
the Interstate Commerce Commission authority to prescribe a general
level of railroad rates for traffic entirely within a state as a part of its
duty of preventing an undue burden being placed upon interstate com-
merce and has upheld the statute, as so construed, as within the power
of Congress under the commerce clause.
The fundamental principles which are involved have long been free
from doubt. Thus by Gibbons v. Ogden it wa' settled that the power
of Congress to regulate commerce among the several states is "complete
in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no
limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution."2 The
Supreme Court frequently has declared that on subjects which require
uniformity of regulation throughout the country the power of Congress
' (1824, U. S,) g Wheat. i.
'Ibid. at p. 196.
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is exclusive and the non-action of Congress confers upon the states no
power to act. On the other hand, it is recognized that there are matters
affecting interstate commerce admitting of diversity of treatment accord-
ing to the requirements of local conditions and that as to these a
state may act until Congress sees fit to do so, but that when Congress
does act, the exercise of its authority over-rides all conflicting state
legislation.3 However, a state may under no circumstances impose
direct burdens upon interstate commerce.
4
Although these general principles have long been recognized, the
fact that the same carriers are engaged in transportation both among and
within the several states and that interstate and intrastate commerce are
to a greater or lesser extent related has made difficult the application of
the principles and has given rise to many interesting questions as to
where the line is to be drawn between federal and state authority. A
brief review of a few of the leading cases in which the question has
been presented will serve to indicate the development of the law prior
to the time of the passage of the Transportation Act of i92o.
The case of Louisville & Nashville Co. v. Eubank
5 presented the
question of the validity of a provision of the constitution of Kentucky
adopted in 1891 making it unlawful for a carrier to receive a greater
compensation for the transportation of passengers or property for a
shorter than for a longer distance over the same line-the shorter being
included within the longer. The state court had construed this provi-
sion as applying not only to transportation entirely within the state but
also to transportation from a point in another state so as to make it
unlawful for a carrier to charge less for transportation from that point
to a destination in Kentucky than from an intermediate point in Ken-
tucky to the same destination. The Supreme Court held this provision
' Cooley v. Board of Wardens (i851, U. S.) 12 How. 299, 319; E parte McNiel
(1872, U. S.) 13 Wall. 236, 240; Welton v. Missouri (1875) 91 U. S. 275, 280;
County of Mobile v. Kimball'(i88o) 1O2 U. S. 691, 697; Gloucester Ferry Co. v.
Pennsylvania (1885) 114 U. S. 196, 204, 5 Sup. Ct 826, 828; Bowman v. Chicago,
etc. Ry. (888) 125 U. S. 465, 481, 485, 8 Sup. Ct. 689, 696, 698; Gulf, Colo., &
S. F. Ry. v. Hefley (1895) 158 U. S. 98, 103, 104, 15 Sup. Ct 802, 8o3, 8o4;
Northern Pac. Ry. v. Washingto; (1912) 222 U. S. 370, 378, 32 Sup. Ct. 16o, 161;
So. Ry. v. Reid (1912) 222 U. S. 424, 436, 32 Sup. Ct 14o, 142.
'Thus, a state may not tax interstate commerce as such. State Freight Tax
Cases (1872, U. S.) 15 Wall. 232; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas (igio) aI6
U. S. i, 3o Sup. Ct 19o. See also Powell, supra p. 799, et seq. It may not prohibit
interstate trade in legitimate articles of commerce. L. & N. Ry. v. Cook Brewing
Co. (1912) 223 U. S. 70, 32 Sup. Ct 189. A state may not impose penalties for
failure of a telegraph company to make prompt delivery of interstate messages.
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Boegli (1920) 251 U. S. 315, 40 Sup. Ct 167. It may
not require an interstate railroad to detour its passenger trains in order to serve a
small community also served by local trains. St. L. & S. F. Ry. v. Public Service
Corn. of MissourI (1921) 254 U. S. 535, 41 Sup. Ct 192. A state may not pre-
scribe rates to be charged for transportation from one state to another. Wabash v.
Illinois (1886) 118 U. S. 557, 7 Sup. Ct 4.
(1902) 184 U. S. 27, 22 Sup. Ct 277.
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invalid as being a regulation of interstate commerce because it so linked
the interstate rate with the rate for the shorter haul that the interstate
charge was directly controlled by the state law. In other words, it
held that a state, under the guise of regulating rates within its borders,
could not make the validity of interstate rates depend-upon the level
of rates prescribed for intrastate traffic.
In the Minnesota Rate CasesG the court was again called upon to
determine the validity of the action of a state in prescribing a general
basis of rates for traffic within the state. This time the state action
was limited strictly to intrastate transportation, but it was assailed upon
the ground that since the rates prescribed were on a lower basis than the
rates applying between points in the state and points in other states,
they resulted in a direct burden upon interstate traffic and in dis-
crimination against localities in other states." An important feature
of this case was that the interstate rates had not been prescribed or
approved by federal authority It was held that in the absence of
federal action the power of the state to prescribe reasonable intrastate
rates was not restricted by the effect which these rates might have upon
the interstate rates of the carriers.8
Next came the Shreveport case.9 The state of Texas had prescribed
rates for transportation over the lines of *the various carriers between
points within its borders. These rates were lower than the interstate
rates of the same carriers applying from points in Louisiana to destina-
tions in Texas. The Interstate Commerce Commission found that the
lower intrastate rates resulted in discrimination against Shreveport,
Louisiana, located near the Texas border, and in favor of nearby com-
peting points in Texas. Although the Commission found that some
of the interstate rates were reasonable, it ordered that the discrimination
be removed by reducing all the rates from Shreveport. The carriers
attacked this order as beyond the power of the Commission, it being
contended that "so far as the interstate rates were sustained by the
Commission as reasonable, the Commission was without authority to
compel their reduction in order to equalize them with the lower intra-
state rates." The Supreme Court held: first, that the federal authority
being supreme, Congress had the power to deal with intrastate rates
if necessary. to remove discrimination against interstate commerce;O10
(1913) 230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729.
'See 236 U. S. at p. 397, 33 Sup. Ct. at p. 739.
'See the opinion of Mr. Justice Hughes 230 U. S. at pp. 417, 432, 33 Sup. Ct.
at pp. 747, 754.9Houston & Texas Ry. v. United States (914) 234 U. S. 342, 34 Sup. Ct 833.
"0 "Wherever the interstate and intrastate transactions of carriers are so related
that the government of the one involves the control of the other, it is Congress,
and not the State, that is entitled to prescribe the final and dominant rule, for
otherwise Congress would be denied the exercise of its constitutional authority
and the State, and not the Nation, would be supreme within the national field."
234 U. S. at p. 351, 34 Sup. Ct at p. 836.
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second, that under section 3 of the Act to Regulate Commerce" Congress
had conferred authority upon the Interstate Commerce Commission to
prevent discrimination in rates against shippers and localities in interstate
commerce and that this authority extended to the removal of discrim-
ination caused by intrastate rates; and finally, that since in the case
before it the interstate rates were found by the Interstate Commerce
Commission to be reasonable the Commission could not order them to
be reduced and it was within the rights of the carriers to remove the
discrimination by increasing the intrastate rates, any state regulation
to the contrary notwithstanding.
It should be observed that in the Shreveport case the discrimination
found to exist was against a particular locality and because of specific
intrastate rates. There was, therefore, no question presented as to the
power of the federal government to require the general basis of
rates throughout a state to be made the same as that of the inter-
state rates or of its power to deal with intrastate rates, except to remove
discrimination against particular shippers or localities.
Illinois Central Ry. v. Public Utilities Commission
1 2 was similar to
the Shreveport case 2 and is worthy of comment only because it suggests
that even under section 3 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, as it then
read, the Interstate Commerce Commission might have power to pre-
scribe a general basis of rates throughout a state.14
Briefly summarized these cases established the following principles:
I. A state might not make the level of interstate rates dependent
upon intrastate rates.
2. It might, on the other hand, prescribe reasonable rates for intra-
state transportation and its action in so doing was not rendered invalid
because these rates might discriminate against localities or shippers
engaged in interstate commerce, provided the interstate rates had not
been prescribed or approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
"Section 3 of the Act to Regulate Commerce provides: "That it shall be
unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act to make or
give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person,
company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic, in
any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, company, firm,
corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic, to any undue or
unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever." Act of Febru-
ary 4, 1887 (24 Stat. at L. 379, 380) chi. 1O4, sec. 3.
(1918) 245 U. S. 493, 38 Sup. Ct. 170.
See 245 U. S. at p. 5o6, 38 Sup. Ct. at p. 174.
""Had the Commission regarded the discrimination as state-wide it is but
reasonable to believe that it would have said so'in its findings. And had it intended
to require or authorize a state-wide readjustment of the intrastate rates it doubtless
would have given direct expression to that purpose, which easil r could have been
done in a few lines." 245 U. S. at p. 508, 38 Sup. Ct. at p. 175.
The Commission had, however, found that the discrimination against interstate
commerce was caused by intrastate rates from particularly named border points
and, therefore, the court held its order void because it did not clearly specify that
these were the rates to be changed.
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3. The Interstate Commerce Commission, however, had the power
to prevent such discrimination and if it had prescribed or approved
the interstate rates' 5 it could order the discrimination removed
and the particular intrastate rates causing the discrimination adjusted
to the basis of the interstate rates. (Sed quaere, whether it couldprescribe a general basis of intrastate rate s if it found this neces-
sary to remove the discrimination against the localities or shippers
engaged in interstate commerce.)
Such was the state of the law when by congressional and executive'
action the railroads of the country were taken over by the Federal
Government.Y6 Since the Federal Government was acting under its
war power, the railroads were not subject to state regulation even as to
intrastate traffic. 7 The President, acting through the Director-General
of Railroads, increased all freight rates, both interstate and intrastate,
and established a general basis of passenger fares which was higher
than permitted under the statutes of a number of states.
When, after the conclusion of the war, it became necessary to provide
for the termination of federal control, Congress was faced with the fact
that the costs of railroad operation had so increased that if the railroads
were to be financially able to carry on their business, and in a position
to attract needed capital, their revenues must be protected. Accordingly
Congress included in those portions of the Transportation Act of 1920
having to do with the return of the railroads to their owners, a provi-
sion that after September I, 1920, the Government should guarantee
them certain revenue and that prior to that date their rates should not
be reduced without the approval of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion. By other portions of the Transportation Act Congress made
various changes in the Act to Regulate Interstate Commerce (now
called the Interstate Commerce Act), among others, adding thereto Sec-
tion I5(a) which provided in substance that the Interstate Commerce
Commission should divide the railroads of the country into groups and
prescribe rates such that the carriers as a whole, or in each group, should
earn an aggregate annual net operating income equal to a fair return
upon the aggregate value of the railway property of such carriers held
for and used in the service of transportation, and provided further
that for the period of two years subsequent to March I, 192o, such fair
return should be five and one-half per cent.
Acting under this section, the Interstate Commerce Commission, upon
the application of the carriers, entered upon an investigation8 in which
" This, of course, is the distinction between the Shreveport case and theMinnesota Rate Cases. The question was expressly reserved in Mr. JusticeHughes' opinion in the latter. (1913) 230 U. S. 352, at p. 419, 33 Sup. Ct 729, at
p. 748.
"°Federal Possession and Control Act of Aug. 29, 1916 (39 Stat at L. 61g, 645);
Federal Control Act of _March 21, 1918 (40 Stat at L. 451).
'
TNorthern Pacific Ry. v. North Dakota (1919) 250 U. S. 135, 39 Sup. Ct. 502.
sEx Parte 74 (1920) 58 I. C. C. 220.
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it found that in order to earn the return specified in the Act the carriers
should increase their freight and passenger rates to certain bases specified
therein and authorized the carriers to make such increases.
The carriers thereupon proceeded to file tariffs with the Interstate
Commerce Commission and with the various state commissions, putting
into effect both interstate and within the several states the advanced
rates authorized. With a few exceptions no objection was made by
state authorities to the intrastate freight rates. The increased passenger
fares were, however, in a number of instances higher than the fares
allowed by various state laws or orders of the state public service
commissions, and, therefore, the state authorities, among them those of
Wisconsin and New York, refused to permit the fares to become effec-
tive for intrastate business.
At the time of the passage of the Transportation Act Congress had
added to section 13 of the Act to Regulate Commerce paragraph 3,
expressly authorizing a carrier to petition the Interstate Commerce
Commission to institute an investigation into "any rate, fare, charge,
classification, regulation, or practice, made or imposed by authority
of any State," and authorizing the Commission to enter upon such an
investigation. Paragraph 4 was also added to this section; it provides
as follows:
"Whenever the Commission, after full hearing, finds that any such
rate, . . . . causes any undue or unreasonable advantage, preference,
or prejudice as between persons or localities in intrastate commerce on
the one hand and interstate or foreign commerce on the other hand, or
any undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against interstate or
foreign commerce, which is hereby forbidden and declared to be unlaw-
ful, it shall prescribe the rate, . . . . thereafter to be charged . . . . in
such manner as, in its judgment, will remove such advantage, preference,
prejudice, or discrimination. Such rates ..... shall be observed while
in effect, by the carriers parties to such proceeding affected thereby, the
law of any State of the decision or order of any State authority to the
contrary notwithstanding."
Proceeding under this section the carriers in Wisconsin and in New
York filed petitions with the Interstate Commerce Commission asking
it to institute investigations with respect to the passenger fares required
by the state authorities to be maintained within those states.19 The
interested states were notified of these proceedings, as required by section
13 of the Interstate Commerce Act, and took part therein. In both of
these investigations the Interstate Commerce Commission found that
the operating and transportation conditions were substantially the same
for intrastate as for interstate passenger service; that intrastate pas-
sengers paying lower rates rode on the same trains and in the same cars
with interstate passengers paying higher rates; that the maintenance
" Similar cases were instituted by carriers with respect to the rates in many
other states.
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of intrastate fares lower than the interstate fares authorized in Ex Parte
7420 would result in serious financial loss to the carriers; and concluded
that this situation resulted in undue prejudice to a person traveling in
interstate commerce and in unjust discrimination against interstate
commerce. The Commission found further that the prejudice and dis-
crimination should be removed by making effective in intrastate com-
merce the rates of fare authorized by it in Ex Parte 74 and ordered the
carriers so to do.
21
Following the issuance of the Commission's order in the Wisconsin
case, the carriers, parties thereto, filed bills in equity in the District
Court to prevent the State Railroad Commissioners and other state
officers from interfering in the maintenance of the fares thus ordered
and published. The case came to the United States Supreme Court on
appeal from the decision of three judges under section 366 of the
Judicial Code granting an interlocutory injunction. In New York,
however, the court proceedings were not instituted by the carriers but
by the state which brought a bill in equity against the United States
and the Interstate Commerce Commission to annul and enjoin the
enforcement of the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
The New York case being a direct proceeding to set aside an order of
the Interstate Commerce Commission, the state was entitled to rely upon
the absence of any substantial evidence to sustain a material finding as
a basis for attacking the order; while in the Wisconsin case, since the
defence of the State authorities was a collateral attack upon the Com-
mission's order, they were obliged to show that the order was void on
its face whether supported by the evidence or not. The court held,
however, that this circumstance did not require a different conclusion
in the two cases.
In both of these cases, as in the Shreveport case, there existed, what
was lacking in the Minnesota Rate Cases, action by the federal authori-
ties finding discrimination and prescribing interstate rates. A question,
however, which was not involved in the Shreveport case and was only
suggested in the Illinois Central case was presented by reason of the fact
that the Commission's orders purported to apply to all intrastate rates
throughout New York and Wisconsin and were not limited to the rates
from' particular borderline points. 22  The court held that there was not
20 Supra note 18.
' Wisconsin Passenger Fares (192o) 59 I. C. C. 391; In the matter of Rates,
Fares and Charges of the New York Central Ry. and other railroad companies in
the State of New York (192o) 59 I. C. C. 29o.
" "The order in this case, however, is much wider than the orders made in the
proceedings following the Shreveport and Illinois Central cases. There, as here,
the report of the Commission showed discrimination against persons and localities
at border points, and the orders were extended to include all rates or fares from
all points in the state to border points. ' But this order is not so restricted. It
includes fares between all interior points although neither may be near the border
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a sufficient showing that all local state rates discriminated against persons
or places in interstate commerce to justify an order requiring all of the
state rates to be increased on this ground alone.
23  In other words, the
court concluded that under section 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act,
which was the foundation of the Shreveport case, the Interstate Com-
merce Commission had no power to order a general revision of all state
rates, but had the power to deal only with such state rates as caused
unjust discrimination to particular persons or localities engaged in inter-
state commerce, and that the power of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission to make the orders which it did in the Wisconsin and the New
York cases must be found, if at all, in the provisions added to the
Interstate Commerce Act by the Transportation Act of 1920.
The court had, therefore, to consider two questions: first, whether
by the Transportation Act and the amendments made by it to the Inter-
state Commerce Act Congress had intended to confer upon the Interstate
Commerce Commission the power to deal generally with intrastate rates,
and second, whether, if it had done so, its action was constitutional.
Obviously the intention of Congress is to be found first in the amend-
ments made to section 13. It was contended by the states that the
provisions which were added to section 13 did not enlarge the powers of
the Interstate Commerce Commission to deal with intrastate rates, but
merely put in statutory form the principles of the Shreveport case. It
would have been difficult to escape this conclusion had the amendment to
section 13 given to the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to
prevent discrimination only "as between persons and localities in intra-
state commerce on the one hand and interstate or foreign commerce on
the other ;" but paragraph 4 of section 13 contained the further clause
declaring unlawful "any undue, unreasonable or unjust discrimination
against interstate or foreign commerce" as the result of state rates, and
giving the Commission the power to prevent such discrimination. The
court said that this indicated that what Congress was trying to prevent
was not alone discrimination against particular persons or localities in
interstate commerce, but against interstate commerce as a whole.24  The
court pointed out further that in enacting the Transportation Act of 1920
Congress intended to make such general provisions as would render it
and the fares between them may not work a discrimination against interstate
travellers at all. Nothing in the precedents cited justifies an order affecting all
rates of a general description when it is clear that this would include many rates
-not within the proper class or the reason of the order. In such a case, the saving
clause by which exceptions are permitted can not give the order validity. As said
by the court in the Illinois Central case, 'it is obvious that an order of a subordi-
nate agency, such as the Commission, should not be given precedence over a state
rate statute, otherwise valid unless, and' except so far as, it conforms to a high
standard of certainty.'" (1922) 42 Sup. Ct. 232, at p. 234. See also Americat
Express Co. v. Caldwell (1917) 244 U. S. 617, 627, 37 Sup. Ct. 656, 661.
(922) 42 Sup. Ct 232, at p. 234.
"Ibid. at p. 237.
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possible for the carriers to furnish competent service in interstate com-
merce; that, as part of this scheme, it had directed the Interstate Com-
merce Commission to establish a general basis of rates which would bring
adequate revenue to the carriers; that the enforcement of the state
restrictions would result in a serious financial loss to the carriers and
would increase the financial burden upon interstate commerce, therebyinterfering with its purpose and with the efficient regulation of interstate
commerce by the Federal Government; and that it must have been thepurpose of Congress to prevent such interference. The court, there-fore, held that Congress had not limited the power of the InterstateCommerce Commission to the prevention of discrimination betweenparticular persons or localities, but had conferred upon it the power toprescribe a general basis of intrastate rates when necessary to prevent an
undue financial burden upon interstate commerce.
On the question of the constitutionality of such action by Congress,
the court held that the regulation of state rates was merely incidentalto the regulation of interstate commerce; that since interstate and intra-
state commerce were performed by the same agencies and were so inter-
mingled that the Federal Goverinment could not exercise complete and
effective control over interstate commerce without incidental regulation
of intrastate commerce, such incidental regulation was not unconstitu-
tional.25
This conclusion, far-reaching as it appears to be, must inevitably
follow from the logical application to the realities of the situation ofthe fundamental principles relating to the subject. It is a recognition
of the truth, that the transportation systems of the country are notdivided by the boundaries of the states but are nation-wide institutions
to be dealt with in the interest of the country as a whole.The New York case presents one question which is not raised in theW sconsin case. An early charter of the New York Central RailroadCompany bound the company to charge not more than two cents a milefor passenger carriage between Buffalo and Albany. It was objectedby the state that this charter was a contract with the state and that if
the Transportation Act permitted the Interstate Commerce Commission,by an order, to enable the railroad company to charge more than two
cents a mile, it impaired the obligation of a contract in violation of art.i, section io, of the Federal Constitution. The court dismissed this
contention on the obvious ground that the constitutional provision
referred to was a restriction upon the powers of a state but did not
restrict Congress or the United States. The fact of this charter pro-
vision, however, suggests another question which apparently was not
raised when the case was before the court, namely, whether a charterprovision with respect to the rate of fare which a railroad may chargeis a limitation upon its corporate powers, and whether Congress in estab-
See opinion 42 Sup. Ct at p. 239.
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lishing a general basis of rates throughout the country, can confer upon
a state corporation the power to charge on intrastate traffic a rate of
fare which, under the law creating the corporation, it has no power to
charge'.26 PARKER MCCOLLESTER
New York City
CAN AN INJURY BY A GOVERNMENT VESSEL CREATE A MARITIME 
LIEN?
Mr. Justice Holmes in a recent decision of the United States Supreme
Court, United States v. Thompson (1922) 42 Sup. Ct. 159, has upset a
long established doctrine of maritime law-justifying the revolution on
the ground that he was doing away with a fiction. The importance of
the case warrants an examination of the soundness of his logic and of
the public policy involved.
It had been deemed a settled rule that when a vessel owned or requisi-
tioned and operated by the Government collided with a private vessel, a
maritime lien against the former for the damage caused could not be
enforced while it was under government control but could be enforced
as soon as it reached private hands.- A British admiralty court has in
fact so decided within the last few weeks.
2 In the decision under dis-
cussion, the Supreme Court dealt with three ships, each of which while
under government ownership or control had collided with a private
vessel, the owners of which libelled the offending vessels after they had
passed out of government control into private hands. In each case the
Supreme Court issued a writ of prohibition preventing the United
States District Courts from exercising jurisdiction.
Perhaps the most noteworthy feature of the decision-five judges
against three-is the ground upon which justice Holmes, speaking for
the majority, supports it. He addresses himself not to the policy or
expediency of the rule denying redress to the victim of the collision,
but derives his conclusion from the application of pure logic-
a mode of judicial reasoning to which Justice Holmes has been known to
object.' He asserts that no lien could arise against a vessel operated by
"It seems that Congress may confer upon a state corporation powers which it
does not possess under its state charter. Cherokee Nation v. So. Kansas Ry.
(18go) 135 U. S. 641, 657, 10 Sup. Ct 965, 971. Whether Congress has done this
in the present instance may be more doubtful, though sec. 13, as amended, seems to
be sufficient for this purpose.
The Siren (1868, U. S.) 7 Wall. 152; The Athol (1842) I Win. Rob. 374;
Workman v. New York (1899) 179 U. S. 552, 566, 21 Sup. Ct. 212, 217; The
Florence H. (1918, S. D. N. Y.) 248 Fed. 12.
'The Tervaete (1922) 38 T. L. R. 46o, by Sir Henry Duke, President of the
Probate and Admiralty Division.
"Holmes, Collected Legal Papers (1920) 181; see also the dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Holmes in Vegelahn v. Guintner (1896) 167 Mass. 92, lo6, 44 N. E.
iO77, io8o: "The true grounds of decision are considerations of policy and of
social advantage, and it is vain to suppose that solutions can be attained merely
by logic and the general propositions of law which nobody disputes."
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the Government, even for future enforcement against a private vendee,because the "United States has not consented to be sued for torts andtherefore it cannot be said that, in a legal sense, the United States hasbeen guilty of a tort. For a tort is a tort in a legal sense only becausethe law has made it so." That is, because there is no immediate remedy,
there is no legal injury. There never having been a "tort" creating alien, there was none to revive or enforce against the vessel when it came
within private control. "Legal obligations that exist but cannot be
enforced are ghosts that are seen in the law, but that are elusive to thegrasp." And he justifies his assumption that the Government could
not commit a "tort" on the absolutist theory of Hobbes, to whichjustice Holmes has given expression on a number of occasions,4 "thatthe authority that makes the law is itself superior to it, and that, if it
consents to apply to itself the rules that it applies to others, the consent
is free and may be withheld."
It is believed that there are several fallacies in this reasoning which
account for a decision involving an undesirable overturn of the law
contrary to good public policy. Maritime liens and the convenience ofbringing the defendant into court by permitting the plaintiff to attachthe res lie at the foundation of maritime enterprise, insuring that
security which it is one of the functions of the law to promote. It
should- not be lightly abandoned.
Does Justice Holmes aid the solution of the legal problem by saying
that as the United States has not consented to be sued for torts, therefore
"in a legal sense the United States has not been guilty of a tort ?" Theimmunity of the King from suit, derived from history, convenience, or
expediency, was primarily jurisdictional in character, and the resultingdictum that in substantive law the King could do no wrong was aninaccurate fiction. The injury at all events gave rise to a legal right,
usually against the officer. 5 While it may be true that as a matter ofprivate law, the absence of an enforceable remedy justifies the conclu-
sion that there was no breach of duty, still it seems like a non sequitur to
assert that because the Government cannot commit a "tort" in a "legal
'Kawananakoa v. Polyblank (19o6) 205 U. S. 349, 353, 27 Sup. Ct. 526, 527.
'Among the various grounds advanced .to sustain the immunity of the Kingfrom the jurisdiction of the courts were these: that the King cannot issue awrit to himself: United States v. Lee (1882) io6 U. S. 196, 206, I Sup. Ct. 240,248; that there is an inconsistency in the idea of supreme executive ponwer and
'subjection to suit: Briggs v. Light Boats (1865, Mass.) ii Alien, I57; that itwould embarrass the State in the performance of its duties to be compelled tosubmit its instruments and property to the control of courts, to judgment andexecution: John Marshall in the Virginia Convention, 3 Elliott's Debates quotedin Hans v. Louisiana (189o) 134 U. S. i, io Sup. Ct. 5o4; also Matthews, J., inIn re Ayers (1887) 123 U. S. 443, 8 Sup. Ct. 164; that states should not becoerced to pay debts which for various reasons they might not be willing or con-veniently able to pay, thus suggesting the main reason for the adoption of theEleventh Amendment: Marshall, C. 3., in Cohens v. Virginia (1821, U. S.) 6
Wheat. 264, 406.
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sense"-a conception of private and not of public law-therefore it
cannot commit an injury which may give rise to a maritime lien
"against the vessel"-admitting for the moment this cryptic concept of
maritime law. If it is true that there was no ihitial maritime wrong, as
Justice Holmes says, why could the resulting damages be set off or
recouped when the Government instituted an action against the vessel
injured?6 It will be conceded that the Government is capable of waiv-
ing its immunity from suit;7 and if it does so, the jurisdictional bar
being thus removed, is there any doubt what law is to be applied,? The
maritime law in fact permits the enforcement of various liens even
against Government property where the Government's possession is not
disturbed.8 The collision endows the owner of the injured vessel with
certain rights enforceable against the Government itself, according to
settled rules of law-provided the Government waives its jurisdictional
immunity by entering an appearance-and enforceable against any
future private owner of the vessel. In this respect the victim may be
said to have a future conditional right, and it rests upon the fact that
he was injured and that sound policy requires compensation, except at
direct government expense. The inability to enforce the "lien" against
the Government-the owner can of course sue the wrongdoing officer
in personam-is not an indication that there was no legally operative
fact creating a cause of action, future and conditional though it may be.
A foreign ambassador committing a common-law crime is immune from
prosecution by virtue of his official position, but when his diplomatic
immunity ceases and he becomes a private citizen within the jurisdiction
is there any doubt as to his liability to punishment or as to the law
applicable ? Justice McKenna, dissenting in the instant case, must
therefore be supported when he says: "I reject absolutely that because
the Government is exempt from suit, that it cannot be accused of fault."
Whether or not the United States was "guilty of a tort" in a "legal
sense," seems altogether immaterial.
Equally open to question, in the judgment of the writer, is the concep-
'The Siren, supra note i. Mr. Justice Holmes makes an unconvincing effort
to distinguish this case, which seems to contradict his theory that there never
was k "tort" ab initio. See United States v. Ringgold (1834, U. S.) 8 Pet 150.
Before international tribunals, there is no doubt of the Government's liability for
negligent collisions by its public vessels. The Sidra (Great Britain) v. United
States, tribunal under Treaty of August i, Igio, decided Nov. 29, 1921. (1922)
6 Am. JouP. INT. LAW, 110.
'De Simone v. Transportes Maritimos do Estado (1922, App. Div.) 192 N. Y.
Supp. 815, 816, and cases there cited.
8 The St. Jago de Cuba (1824, U. S.) 9 Wheat. 409 (lien for seaman's wages);
United States v. Wilder (1838, U. S. C. C.) 3 Sumner, 3o8 (lien for general
average); The Davis (1869, U. S.) io Wall. 15; United States v. Morgan (igoo,
C. C. A. 4th) 99 Fed. 570, 572 (lien for salvage).
s The Athol, supra note i ; Act of Sept 7, 1916 (39 Stat at L. 728, 730) ch. 451,
sec. 9; Act of March 9, 1920 (41 Stat at L. 526) ch. 95, sec. 4-
"Re Suarez [1918, C. A.] i Ch. 176.
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tion that the authority that makes the law is superior to it. The thesis
may involve a restricted definition of law, to which all persons may notbe willing to subscribe. Regarding law, however, as the body of rules of
conduct which express the moral sense or conceptions of convenience
of the organized community as to human relations, whether derivedfrom custom or statute, and whose violation'- is visited with socialdisapproval, courts constituting but one of several agencies for thispurpose-it may still be true that while the rules of private law may beinapplicable to many of the activities of the Government, nevertheless
the Government cannot be said to be above the rule of law-usuallypublic law. Because the judgments of the Court of Claims cannot be
enforced without a voluntary appropriation by Congress, can it be saidthat the rules of conduct laid down by that court as to the relationbetween the Government and the individual are not law? And even ifthe individual must still suffer many injuries at the hands of the Govern-
ment without compensation, does it follow that the Government is thereby
superior to the law? Is not its very immunity from suit or responsibility
the rule of public law governing the individual's relation to the state in
many (not all) of the state's activities? The alleged superiority of the
state to the law may have been consistent with the theory of the autocraticking and state which Iobbes and Austin had in mind, but it seems incon-
sistent with constitutional self-government. It may be consistent with
the Machtstaat which prevailed in political theory during the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, but it is inconsistent with the Rechtstaat whichhas received almost universal support in Europe since the middle of the
nineteenth century.' 2 Is not the state the aggregate, the associated peo-ple ?13 Why assume that the group intends to regard itself as above alllaw, or has endowed any of its agencies, legislative or judicial, with thepower to assert such superiority? The courts of other countries, such asFrance and Germany, find no sacrilege in subjecting the state to law-in
many instances applying the rules of private law-and in holding the
state primarily or secondarily responsible for the tortious acts of its
officers, often without the aid of statute.'- Writers like Dicey'5 andVinogradoffle deny any superiority or irresponsibility of the state to
law.
'There are, of course, many rules of law, principally involved in the concep-tion of privilege, which are incapable of violation."Duguit, Law in the Modern State (1919) ch. I; Krabb6, Die Moderne
Staats-Idee (2d ed. 9ip) chs. I and 2.
"Carr6 de Malberg, Contribution t la Thiorie Gnrale de l'Etat (1920) 31.
' See citations in Hauriou, Les Actions en Indemniti contre 'Etat pour Pre-judices Causds dans L'Admin stration Publique (1896) 6 REv. DE DROT PUBLIC,51-65; Bernegg, Uber die Entschiidigungspflicht des Staates bei Ausilbung derOeffentlichen. Gewalt (1921). The numerous qualifications of the doctrine incontinental Europe will be reserved for subsequent discussion.
'Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th ed.
1915) 179 et seq., 402 et seq.
"Vinogradoff, Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence (192o) 85.
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Apart from the dangerous public policy of regarding groups in the
community, political, social, or industrial, even the group of the whole,
as above the law, and the injustice done in the instant case to the inno-
cent victim of official carelessness, the theory relied upon by the court
manifests a tendency to enlarge the scope of governmental immunity
from suit and responsibility. This is directly opposed to that of the rest
of the world and even to that found in our law of municipal corporations.
It but indicates the need in this country of further legislative protection
for the individual against the injuries inflicted upon him in the operation
of the social enterprise known as the state.
E. M. B.
LIABILITY FOR PAYMENTS ON STOCK ISSUED FOR OVERVALUED 
PROPERTY
OR FOR PROPERTY NOT LEGAL PAYMENT
Under modern statutes payment for the issue
1 of stock by a corpora-
tion is often expressly limited to money or property actually received,
or labor done, other forms of payment being forbidden. Furthermore
the property or labor must not be overvalued.
2 Some statutes also pro-
vide that no issue can be made until the stock is full-paid.
8 In cases
where stock has been issued, or a contract made for its issue, in violation
' The term "issue" in the phrase "issue of stock," as it is used in the cases, is
metaphorical, and perhaps derived from the actual issue of certificates. The
phrase "issue of stock" seems to be used by the courts to signify corporate recog-
nition of a subscriber as owning a share, or proportional interest, in the capital
assets of the corporation.
2 The methods of determining sufficiency of value are outside the strict scope
of this comment. One of two rules is usually used. The first is the true-value
rule. This in effect is that the received property is sufficient to authorize a given
issue of stock when the true value of the property is equal to the nominal value
of the issue, or to the value authorized by charter to be received in return for
the issue. For purposes of applying this rule, the value of the property seems
to consist in its actual purchasing power in terms of dollars at the time of 
the
transaction. The true-value rule was applied in Tramp v. Marquesen, infra,
note 6; Lavell v. Bullock, infra; note. 15; Detroit-Kentucky Coal Co. v. Bickett
Coal and Coke Co., infra note lO. The second method is the good-faith rule,
which briefly is that the property is sufficient when the appraisal of its value,
made in good faith by the directors of the corporation, is equal to the nominal
value of the issue, or to the value authorized by charter to be received in return
for the issue. This test of value substitutes for a determination of actual pur-
chasing power an estimated purchasing power. Caldwell v. Robilson (1920)
179 N. C. 518, io3 S. E. 75; Conley v. Hunt (1920) 94 
Conn. 551, iog Ati. 887.
The good faith rule was applied in Scully v. Autonobile Finance Co., and
Winters v. Liludsay, infra note 5.
'Where a statute is of this kind, the issue of stock at a discount, payment
being made in money, is analogous to an issue for overvalued property, and is 'so
treated in this comment. The corporation accepts $20, and issues stock of $ioo
par value. It thus receives property worth only $2o and makes an issue that is
only authorized to be made for $ioo.
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of the provisions of such statutes, what is the position of the various
parties involved in the transaction?
Take first the position of the corporation. The corporation may con-
sist in just those persons who assented to the illegal issue. Or it may
consist in those persons, plus other innocent shareholders who have paidfull value for their shares. In the former case it seems clear that the
corporation should have no remedy against the subscriber. In the latter
case may these innocent shareholders, either in their own name or in
that of the corporation, maintain an action to cancel the issue? It seemsjust that they should be able to do so. Both common law and statutes
should be designed to give the maximum protection to innocent share-holders. Accordingly it is held that such an action may be maintained.4
Some courts, however, do not permit cancellation when the defective
contract is executed, regarding it as more just to consider the contract
of issue as at least partially valid, and full payment of the shares
enforceable.' This result seems somewhat hard on legally uninformed
members of the public who have subscribed for stock issued for less
than its nominal value. Perhaps those courts are fairer which hold
that the defendant subscriber is not liable." Where the subscriber is
also a promoter, courts may be liberal in their remedy to the corpora-
tion,' and harsh to the subscriber.8
Another problem is presented in case the defendant is not a sub-
scriber, but a subscriber's transferee. Of course if he is a transferee
with notice, actual or constructive, of the true state of the transaction,
he should be in no better position than his transferor, and such is onepart of the holding in the recent case of Bowen v. Imperial Theatres,
Inc. (1922, Del. Ch.) 115 Atl.9 i8. But if he is an innocent purchaser
of a certificate as for full-paid and non-assessable shares, the corporation
should not be allowed to bring an action of any sort against him.0 As
"Frame v. Mahoney (1920) 21 Ariz. 282, 187 Pac. 584, under Const. igio, art.
14, sec. 6.
'Scully v. Automobile Finance Co. (1920, Del. Ch.) 1O9 Atl. 49, under Const.1897, art. 9, sec. 3, and Rev. Code, 1915, ch. 65, secs. 1928 and 1934-1937; White-water Tile & Brick.Co. v. Johnson (1920) 171 Wis. 82, 175 N. W. 786; Wintersv. Lindsay (1921, Calif. App.) 198 Pac. 43 (hearing denied by Supreme Court).
'Kanaman. v. Gahagan (1921, Tex.) 230 S. W. 141, under Rev. Sts. 1911, art.1146, and Const. 1876, art. 12, sec. 6; Tramp v. Marquesen (192o) 188 Iowa, 968,176 N. W. 977, under Supp. Code, 1913, secs. 1641 b, d, and f. The situation isaltered when a creditor, and not the corporation, is plaintiff. See infra at p. 886.
Whitewater Tile & Brick Co. v. Johnson, sippra note 5. From the languageof this case, however, it looks as though the same result would have been reachedhad the defendant been an ordinary subscriber rather than a promoter. The
case was decided under Sts. 1898, ch. 85, sec. 1753, as amended by Laws, 19o7, ch.
576, sec. 2.
8Cahall v. Lofland (1921, Del. Ch.) 114 Atl. 224, under Const. 1897, art. 9, sec.3, and Rev. Code, 1915, ch. 65, sec. 1928.
,'Rhode v. Dock-Hop Co., infra note 16; see Lavell v. Bullock infra note 15.Those were actions on behalf of creditors. A fortiori the defence would be good
against the corporation.
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between him and the shareholders of the corporation, the 
protection of
the law should be on his side. There has usually been a 
greater degree
of neglect on the part of the shareholders than on that of 
the bona fide
transferee.
But suppose the position of the parties is reversed, and 
it is the cor-
poration that is defendant. The subscriber may here, in 
the case of an
unexecuted promise of the corporation to recognize him as a stockholder,
be bringing an action to be recognized as such, that is, "to 
have stock
issued" to him, or to obtain damages for failure to do so. 
In either of
these cases judgment should be for the defendant.'
0 The contract is
illegal, and the public and the innocent shareholders are best 
served by
not forcing the corporation to perform. If the subscriber has 
executed
his part of the contract, and furnished property of real, though 
insuffi-
cient, value to the corporation, it seems equitable to let him 
have some
remedy."' If the corporation has issued the stock, and the 
subscriber
is resisting its cancellation, judgment again -should be against the sub-
scriber in cases where his payment has been nugatory. But here 
again-
if he has paid in overvalued property and is willing to 
pay further
assessments, it would perhaps be best not to hold the transaction void,
but to require that all certificates and records be made to show the 
exact
state of the transaction.' 2  If it is not the subscriberbut the subscriber's
bona fide transferee, who is resisting cancellation of his shares, he should
win, for the same reasons that he should not be liable to assessment.'
3
Here again, however, those courts that consider the issue void 
could
-give the transferee no protection against cancellation, though 
perhaps
there would be a remedy against the transferor who represented 
that
the issue was full-paid. If the subscriber is seeking to cancel his 
own
promissory notes, on the ground that they were illegal payment for 
the
issue of stock, it is submitted that he should not be allowed to do so.
But of course in those jurisdictions where the statutes are held to make
an issue for illegal payment void, the cancellation of the notes will be
permitted.' 4
"Detroit-Kentucky Coal Co. v. Bickett Coal & Coke Co. (1918, C. 
C. A. 6th)
251 Fed. 542, under Ky. Const. i8g, sec. 193, (suit by subscriber to compel specific
performance) ; Kirkup v. Anaconda Amusement Co. (1921) 59 Mont. 469, 197
Pac. OO5, under Const. 1889, art. 15, sec. io, and Rev. Code, 1907, sec. 3894, 
as
amended by Laws, 1917, ch. 89 (action for damages for refusal to perform
contract).
'Brockway v. Ready Built House Co. (1920) 95 Or. 386, 187 Pac. 
3O38. In
this case it looks as though the remedy would have to be in a separate action.
For the rule of stockholders' liability in Oregon, see Const. 1859, art. I1, sec. 3,
as amended Nov. 5, 1912, and Olson's Or. Laws, 1920, tit. 43, ch. 3. sec. 7792.
'Cf. Scully v. Automobile Finance Co., supra note 5. In that case it was 
said
that the records must be made to show what had actually been paid on the stock,
and that the shares would be assessable for the purposes of the corporation.
" Discussed infra p. 886.
"'Pruett v. Cattlemen's Trust Co. (i92O, Tex. Com. of App.) 222 S. W. 533,
under Rev. Sts. 1911, art. 1146, and Const. 1876, art. 12, sec. 6.
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Take next the position of a creditor of the corporation, or one repre-
senting a creditor. A creditor-plaintiff at least stands in the shoes ofthe corporation as far as unpaid amounts upon shares are concerned,
where the stock has been improperly issued for overvalued property,
or for property not legal payment. The amount of any debts due the
corporation in such a case should a fortiori be at the disposal of a bonafide creditor. It would seem just that, even in a jurisdiction which gave
to the corporation no remedy of obtaining payment to the par value ofthe shares issued for improper consideration, the creditor should not bedenied such remedy. A creditor can not be protected by cancellation
of the shares; the remedy he wants is to have the stock full-paid in
accordance with the corporate records. But in a jurisdiction that holds
the issue void, the creditor is deprived of this remedy. 15
If the creditor is acting not against a subscriber, but against a sub-
scriber's transferee-provided he be not chargeable with actual or con-
structive notice of the true state of the transaction-an interesting issueis raised. Here both the creditor and the shareholder have acted in goodfaith. Which one should bear the loss" with which both are threatened
on account of their having trusted the representations of the corpora-
tion? Apparently the creditor must suffer."6  He is perhaps more atfault than the transferee. Further he might properly be given a recov-
ery against the officials of the corporation.' But so also, if the trans-feree were held liable, it would seem that he might recover against the
transferor.
In any of these cases, in determining the wisdom of statutes or deci-
sions, the criteria must be the protection of the public, the creditors, and
the innocent shareholders. Certainly those jurisdictions which bluntlyhold void the issue of stock for overvalued property, or for property
that is not legal payment, do not in many situations seem to serve best
the interest of any one of these three groups.
"Lavell v. Bullock (gig, N. D.) 174 N. W. 764, under Const. 1889, art. 7, sec.I38, and Comp. Laws, 1913, secs. 4527, 4528; cf. Terrell v. Warten (1921, Ala.)89 So. 297, under Const. 19Ol, art. 12, sec. 234.
"Rhode v. Dock-Hop Co. (1920, Calif.) 194 Pac. ii, under Civil Code, 1872,sec. 323, as amended by Sts. 19o7, ch. 279, sec. I; 12 A. L. R. 449, note.
" Cf. Lavell v. Bullock, supra note 15.
